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Blockchain is a distributed database which is cryptographically protected against malicious mod-
ifications. While promising for a wide range of applications, current blockchain platforms rely on
digital signatures, which are vulnerable to attacks by means of quantum computers. The same,
albeit to a lesser extent, applies to cryptographic hash functions that are used in preparing new
blocks, so parties with access to quantum computation would have unfair advantage in procuring
mining rewards. Here we propose a possible solution to the quantum-era blockchain challenge and
report an experimental realization of a quantum-safe blockchain platform that utilizes quantum key
distribution across an urban fiber network for information-theoretically secure authentication. These
results address important questions about realizability and scalability of quantum-safe blockchains
for commercial and governmental applications.
INTRODUCTION
The blockchain is a distributed ledger platform with
high Byzantine fault tolerance, which enables achiev-
ing consensus in a large decentralized network of par-
ties who do not trust each other. A paramount feature
of blockchains is the accountability and transparency of
transactions, which makes it attractive for a variety of
applications ranging from smart contracts and finance
to manufacturing and healthcare [1]. One of the most
prominent applications of blockchains is cryptocurren-
cies, such as Bitcoin [2]. It is predicted that ten percent of
global GDP will be stored on blockchains or blockchain-
related technology by 2025 [3].
In a modern blockchain network, any member can in-
troduce a record (transaction) to the ledger. Every trans-
action must be signed by its initiator’s digital signature;
this rule enables, for example, exchange of digital as-
sets between parties. The transactions are stored on
each member’s computer (node) as a sequence of groups
known as blocks. All transactions that have been intro-
duced over a period of time are compiled in a block that
is linked to the previous one [4]. This linking is imple-
mented by cryptographic hash functions: each block con-
tains a hash value of its content, and the content also
includes the hash of the previous block (Fig. 1). Any
modification of a block inside the chain yields a change
of its hash, which would in turn require modification of
all subsequent blocks. This structure protects the data
inside a blockchain from tampering and revision [5].
While each node is allowed, in principle, to introduce
a block to the network, each blockchain network has a
set of rules that organize and moderate the block for-
mation process. In Bitcoin [2], for example, a member
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Figure 1. Organization of data in blockchains (“txn” stands
for “transaction”).
introducing a new block must solve an NP-hard problem:
introduce a set of numbers to the block’s header such that
the hash of that header must not exceed a certain value
(this paradigm is known as proof-of-work). In this way,
the blocks are guaranteed not to emerge too frequently,
so every node has an opportunity to verify the validity
of the block and the transactions therein before a new
block arrives. This ensures the identity of the database
stored by all network nodes. Whenever a new block is
accepted by the community, its “miner” is rewarded in
bitcoins for the computational power they spend.
A more detailed summary of the blockchain concept is
presented in Appendix A.
We see that blockchain relies on two one-way compu-
tational technologies: cryptographic hash functions and
digital signatures. Most blockchain platforms rely on the
elliptic curve public-key cryptography (ECDSA) or the
large integer factorization problem (RSA) to generate a
digital signature [5]. The security of these algorithms is
based on the assumption of computational complexity of
certain mathematical problems [6].
A universal quantum computer would enable efficient
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2solving of these problems, thereby making correspond-
ing digital signature algorithms, including those used in
blockchains, insecure. In particular, Shor’s quantum al-
gorithm solves factorisation of large integers and discrete
logarithms in polynomial time [7]. Another security issue
is associated with Grover’s search algorithm [8], which al-
lows a quadratic speedup in calculating the inverse hash
function. In particular, this will enable a so-called 51-
percent attack, in which a syndicate of malicious parties
controlling a majority of the network’s computing power
would monopolize the mining of new blocks. Such an at-
tack would allow the perpetrators to sabotage other par-
ties’ transactions or prevent their own spending trans-
actions from being recorded in the blockchain. Other
attacks with quantum computing on blockchain technol-
ogy as well as possible roles of quantum algorithms in
the mining process are considered in more detail in re-
cent publications [9–12].
The security of blockchains can be enhanced by us-
ing post-quantum digital signature schemes [13–15] for
signing transactions. Such schemes are considered to
be robust against attacks with quantum computers [15].
However, this robustness relies on unproven assumptions.
Furthermore, post-quantum digital signatures are com-
putationally intensive and are not helpful against attacks
that utilize the quantum computer to dominate the net-
work’s mining hashrate.
In addition to the blockchains based on mining prin-
ciples there are other approaches to distributed ledgers
maintenance, e.g. Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) repli-
cation [16] and practical BFT replication [17]. To our
knowledge, all the proposed approaches either require use
of digital signatures, and hence are vulnerable to quan-
tum computer attacks, or pairwise authenticated chan-
nels at least. We note that the pairwise authentic chan-
nel ensures that each message was not tampered while
passing, but does not solve the transferability issue.”
The way to guarantee authentication in the quantum
era is to use quantum key distribution (QKD), which
guarantees information-theoretic (unconditional) secu-
rity based on the laws of quantum physics [18–21]. QKD
is able to generate a secret key between two parties con-
nected by a quantum channel (for transmitting quantum
states) and a public classical channel (for post-processing
procedures). The technology enabling QKD networks
have been demonstrated in many experiments [22–32]
and is now publicly available through multiple commer-
cial suppliers.
In the present work, we describe a blockchain plat-
form that combines (i) the original BFT state-machine
replication without use of digital signatures [16] (here-
after referred to as the “broadcast protocol”), (ii) QKD
for providing authentication, and implement an experi-
ment demonstrating its capability in an urban QKD net-
work [32]. We believe this scheme to be robust against
not only the presently known capabilities of the quantum
computer, but also those that may potentially be discov-
ered in the future to make post-quantum cryptography
schemes vulnerable.
The utility of QKD for blockchains may appear coun-
terintuitive, as QKD networks rely on trust among nodes,
whereas the earmark of many blockchains is the absence
of such trust. More specifically, one may argue that QKD
cannot be used for authentication because it itself re-
quires an authenticated classical channel for operation.
However, each QKD communication session generates a
large amount of shared secret data, part of which can be
used for authentication in subsequent sessions. There-
fore a small amount of “seed” secret key that the parties
share before their first QKD session ensures their secure
authentication for all future communication [33]. In this
way, QKD can be used in lieu of classical digital signa-
tures.
QUANTUM-SECURED BLOCKCHAIN
Here we consider a blockchain protocol within a two-
layer network with n nodes. The first layer is a QKD
network with pairwise communication channels that per-
mit establishing information-theoretically (uncondition-
ally) secure private key for each pair of nodes. The second
(classical) layer is used for transmitting messages with
authentication tags based on information-theoretically
secure Toeplitz hashing (see Appendix B) that are cre-
ated using the private keys procured in the first layer.
For concreteness, we consider a blockchain maintain-
ing a digital currency. The operation of the blockchain
is based on two procedures: (i) creation of transactions
and (ii) construction of blocks that aggregate new trans-
actions. New transactions are created by those nodes
who wish to transfer their funds to another node. Each
individual new transaction record is constructed akin to
those in Bitcoin, i.e. contains the information about the
sender, receiver, time of creation, amount to be trans-
ferred, and a list of reference transactions that justi-
fies that the sender has enough funds for the operation
(see Appendix A). This record is then sent via authen-
ticated channels to all other n − 1 nodes, thereby en-
tering the pool of unconfirmed transactions. Each node
checks these entries with respect to their local copy of
the database and each other, in order to verify that each
transaction has sufficient funds, and forms an opinion re-
garding the transaction’s admissibility. At this stage, the
community does not attempt to exclude double-spending
events (a dishonest party sending different versions of a
particular transaction to different nodes of the network).
Subsequently, the unconfirmed transactions are aggre-
gated into a block. We abolish the classical blockchain
practice of having the blocks proposed by individual
“miners”, because it is vulnerable to quantum computer
attacks in at least two ways. First, transactions are not
rigged with digital signatures. This means that a miner
has complete freedom to fabricate arbitrary, apparently
valid, transactions and include them in the block. Sec-
ond, a node equipped with a quantum computer is able
3to mine new blocks dramatically faster than any non-
quantum node. This opens a possibility for attacks such
as the 51-percent attack described above.
Instead, we propose to create blocks in a decentral-
ized fashion. To this end, we employ the broadcast pro-
tocol proposed in the classic paper by Shostak, Lam-
port and Pease [16] (see Appendix C). This information-
theoretically secure protocol allows achieving a Byzan-
tine agreement in any network with pairwise authenti-
cated communication provided that the number of dis-
honest parties is less than n/3 (which we assume to be
the case). At a certain moment in time (e.g. every ten
minutes), the network applies the protocol to each uncon-
firmed transaction, arriving at a consensus regarding the
correct version of that transaction (thereby eliminating
double-spending) and whether the transaction is admis-
sible. Each node then forms a block out of all admissible
transactions, sorted according to their time stamps. The
block is added to the database. In this way, the same
block will be formed by all honest parties, thereby elimi-
nating the possibility of a “fork” – the situation in which
several different versions of a block are created simulta-
neously by different miners.
Because the broadcast protocol is relatively forgiv-
ing to the presence of dishonest or faulty nodes, our
blockchain setup has significant tolerance to some of the
nodes or communication channels not operating prop-
erly during its implementation. We also emphasize that,
while the broadcast protocol is relatively data intensive,
the data need not be transmitted through quantum chan-
nels. Quantum channels are only required to generate
private keys.
While the proposed protocol seems to be efficient
against quantum attacks on the distribution of transac-
tions and formation of blocks, the database is still some-
what vulnerable while it is stored. A possible attack
scenario is as follows: a malicious party equipped with a
quantum computer works off-line to forge the database.
It changes one of the past transaction records to its ben-
efit and performs a Grover search for a variant of other
transactions within the same block such that its hash
remains the same, to make the forged version appear le-
gitimate. Once the search is successful, it hacks into all or
some of the network nodes and substitutes the legitimate
database by its forged version. However, the potential of
this attack to cause significant damage appears low, be-
cause the attacker would need to simultaneously hack
at least one-third of the nodes to alter the consensus.
Furthermore, because the Grover algorithm offers only a
quadratic speed-up with respect to classical search algo-
rithms, this scenario can be prevented by increasing the
convention on the length of the block hash to about a
square of its safe non-quantum value.
We experimentally study the proposed blockchain pro-
tocol on the basis of a four-node, six-link network [Fig.
2(a)] with information-theoretically secure authentica-
tion. We use an urban fiber QKD network recently devel-
oped by our team (see Appendix D) to procure authen-
tication keys for two of the links connecting three nodes;
the key generation in the remaining four links is classi-
cal. We sum up main parameters of the implemented
blockchain for four nodes network in Table I.
Number of nodes in the network n = 4
Upper bound on the number of faulty nodes m = 1
Number of rounds in the broadcast protocol 2
Duration of broadcast protocol < 10 sec
Time between block generation events 5 min
Authentication hash length 40 bit
Quantum key consumption in the initial broad-
cast of a transaction
40 bit
Quantum key consumption in the broadcast
protocol
80 bit
Average quantum key consumption required for
a transaction rate of 10 per minute
< 7 bit/s
Table I. Main parameters of the implemented quantum-
secured blockchain.
We test the operation of the blockchain and implement
the construction of a simple transaction block under the
following settings [Fig. 2(a)]. Nodes A, B and C perform
legitimate transactions, whereas node D tries to process
three different transactions, i.e. realize a double-spending
attack. The pool of unconfirmed transactions at each
node thus consist of three legitimate and one inconsistent
transactions. The broadcast protocol is then launched on
the basis of these transaction pools. This protocol elimi-
nates node D’s double-spending transaction after the sec-
ond communication round and permits the formation of a
block containing legitimate transactions only [Fig. 2(c)].
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Figure 2. Creation of a block in a quantum-secure blockchain.
a) Each node who wishes to implement a transaction sends
identical copies of that transaction to all other nodes. Nodes
A, B and C, whose transactions are denoted as txnA, txnB
and txnC, respectively, follow the protocol. Node D is cheat-
ing, attempting to send non-identical versions txnDa, txnDb
and txnDc of the same transaction to different parties. b)
Transaction contents. c) The nodes implement the broadcast
protocol to reconcile the unconfirmed transactions and form
the block. They discover that the transaction initiated by
node D is illegitimate and exclude it.
4CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In summary, we have developed a blockchain proto-
col with information-theoretically secure authentication
based on a network in which each pair of nodes is con-
nected by a QKD link. We have experimentally tested
our protocol by means of a three-party urban fibre net-
work QKD in Moscow.
In addition to using QKD for authentication, we have
redefined the protocol of adding new blocks an a way
that is dramatically different from modern cryptocur-
rencies. Rather than concentrating the development of
new blocks in the hands of individual miners, we em-
ploy the information-theoretically secure broadcast pro-
tocol where all the nodes reach an agreement about a
new block on equal terms.
A crucial advantage of our blockchain protocol is its
ability to maintain transparency and integrity of trans-
actions against attacks with quantum algorithms. Our
results therefore open up possibilities for realizing scal-
able quantum-safe blockchain platforms. If realized, such
a blockchain platform can limit economic and social risks
from imminent breakthroughs in quantum computation
technology.
Typical key generation rates of currently available
QKD technologies are sufficient for operating a large-
scale blockchain platforms based on our protocol. More-
over, remarkable progress in theory and practice of quan-
tum communications, including recent experiments on
ground-to-satellite QKD and quantum repeaters, could
open the door to developing a public worldwide QKD
network (“the quantum Internet” [34]) and extending
quantum-safe blockchain platforms to the global scale.
The development of the “quantum Internet” will al-
low our protocol to preserve anonymity of each network
member. A member will be able to access the global
QKD network from any station, authenticate themselves
to other parties using their private seed keys (see Meth-
ods) and enact a desired transaction.
Our protocol is likely not the only possible quantum-
safe blockchain platform. In this context, important
horizons are opened by technologies that permit direct
transmission of quantum states over multipartite com-
munication networks combined with light quantum in-
formation processing. This includes, for example, pro-
tocols for quantum multiparty consensus [35, 36], other
approaches for QKD [37–40], and quantum digital sig-
natures [41], which have been successfully studied in
experiments, including metropolitan networks [42]. An
additional important research avenue is more efficient,
quantum-technology based consensus algorithms [43] and
general study of quantum channels [39, 44]. Most impor-
tantly, we hope that our work will raise awareness and
interest of the quantum information community to the
problem of security of distributed ledgers in the era of
quantum technology.
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APPENDIX A. BLOCKCHAIN WORKFLOW
Here we sum up the main definitions and concepts of
conventional blockchains.
1. The blockchain is a distributed database in which
the records are organized in a form of consecutive
blocks. The term “distributed” means that copies of
the database are stored by all the nodes that are in-
terested in maintaining it, and that there is no single
control center in charge of the network.
2. Distributed consensus is a set of rules governing the
blockchain construction and operation accepted by the
nodes maintaining this blockchain.
3. A transaction is an elementary record in a blockchain.
In order to create a transaction, one (i) forms a corre-
sponding record, (ii) signs it using a digital signature,
and (iii) sends the record to all the nodes maintain-
ing the blockchain. For example, if we use a blockchain
for maintaining a cryptocurrency, then the transaction
corresponds to a transfer of some amount of money
from one party to another.
4. A block contains a number of transactions created over
a certain period of time. Newly created transactions
enter a so-called pool of unconfirmed transactions. Be-
cause such transactions are created at a faster rate
than the typical network latency time, it is difficult
for the community to agree on their time sequence
and validity. This motivates the solution to aggregate
new transactions into large blocks that are introduced
at regular time intervals that are much longer than the
network latency.
In order to create a block with new transactions, a
node needs to (i) check the validity of new transac-
tions and discard invalid ones, (ii) combine the new
transactions and the hash value of the last block in
the existing blockchain, (iii) fulfill the additional mod-
eration requirements imposed on new proposed block
by the network rules (an example is the proof of work
rule in Bitcoin), and (iv) broadcast the new block to
all other nodes. Each node then verifies the block’s va-
lidity and adds it to the local copy of the blockchain.
5. A situation named fork is possible when non-identical
blocks are generated and broadcast by different miners
at about the same time. In this situation, the commu-
nity becomes temporarily divided as different miners
5will use these different blocks to generate their subse-
quent blocks. To reunite the community, the longest-
chain rule applies: as the both branches continue to
grow, one of them will become longer than others.
At this point, the community chooses this particular
branch as the “correct” one. As a consequence of this
rule, the reliability of any block grows with its depth
relative to the last block in the chain.
6. The cryptographic hash function H(·) is a one-way
map from arbitrary length strings to fixed-length
strings (let say, 256 or 512 bit). The term “crypto-
graphic” means that it act is pseudo-random way, i.e.
any modification of the argument string x (even in a
single bit) yields a major and unpredictable change of
H(x).
Moreover, it is universally believed that there is no
classical algorithm, except brute-force, to invert the
hash function (solve an equation H(x) = h for a given
hash h), and find its collisions (i.e. find the string
x 6= y for a given y such that H(x) = H(y), or even
find two arbitrary distinct strings x and y such that
H(x) = H(y)). Quantum algorithms, in particular,
Grover’s algorithm [8], allow a quadratic speedup in
solving such problems only.
7. A digital signature is an algorithm that allows one to
verify that a certain message (in our case, a transac-
tion) has been created by a particular person. The
basic idea is that the author generates a pair of keys:
a secret key ksec, which must be kept out of reach for
all others, and a public key kpubl, which can be known
to anyone. There is a fixed-length output function
sgn(x, k) taking an arbitrary message x and a secret
key k, such that the triplet
{m, sgn(m, ksec), kpubl} (1)
verifies the fact the author, identified with the public
key kpubl, indeed possesses the corresponding secret
key ksec and signed the message m. On the other hand,
the above triplet does not allow one to determine ksec
using a reasonable amount of classical computational
resources.
APPENDIX B.
INFORMATION-THEORETICALLY SECURE
AUTHENTICATION
Two parties, Alice and Bob, can authenticate messages
sent to each other if they share a secret private key Kaut
that is not known to anyone else. The private key of nec-
essary length can be generated via QKD provided that
the parties have a small amount of “seed” key to authen-
ticate themselves to each other in the beginning of the
session. Once the private key is established, the authen-
tication procedure is as follows: Alice sends to Bob a
message with a hash tag generated using that key. After
receiving the message, Bob also computes its hash tag.
If the hash tags coincide, Bob can be certain that the
message has arrived from Alice.
In our protocol, we use Toeplitz hashing due to its
computational simplicity [45, 46]. Let the lengths of all
messages and their hash tags be lM and lh respectively.
The hash tag of the ith message Mi is calculated accord-
ing to
h(Mi) = TSMi ⊕ ri, (2)
where TS is a lh × lM Toeplitz matrix generated by a
string S of length lh + lM − 1, ri is a bit string of length
lh, and ⊕ is the bitwise xor. Both S and ri are private
and taken from the common private key Kaut. Then the
probability that an eavesdropper will correctly guess the
hash tag of a modified message is not more than 2−lh .
If a series of messages is transmitted, the string S
can be reused without compromising security, while the
string ri must be generated anew every time. In this
way, the private key is consumed at a rate of lh bits per
message. In our experiment, lh = 40 and lM = 2
22.
APPENDIX C. BROADCAST PROTOCOL AND
BLOCK CONSTRUCTION
Here we briefly discribe the protocol for reaching
Byzantine agreement in the presence of faulty nodes [16].
We consider n nodes connected by pairwise authenticated
channels. Let each ith node possess a certain private
value Vi.
The goal of the protocol is to make all nodes aware
of all Vi’s with a complication that there are at most m
“dishonest” (or faulty) nodes. This can be rephrased as
obtaining an n-dimensional interactive consistency vec-
tor ~V cons with the following properties: (i) all the honest
nodes obtain the same vector ~V cons, and (ii) the ith com-
ponent of ~V cons equals Vi for all honest nodes.
The interactive consistency vector is determined
through a series of communication rounds that proceed
as follows.
• In the first round, the nodes transmit their values
of Vi to each other.
• In subsequent rounds, the nodes communicate all
the information they received in the previous round
from other nodes (messages are of the form such
as “node i2 told node i1 that node i3 told node i2
. . . that node ir told node ir−1 that its private value
is U”).
In Ref. [16], Lamport, Shostak and Pease proved that
the interactive consistency vector can be obtained with
no more than m+ 1 rounds for m < n/3.
In our setup, the private value Vi is the pool of trans-
actions received by the ith node (together with its own
transactions), as well as the set of bits indicating the
6node’s opinion of each transaction’s admissibility. After
obtaining the interactive consistency vector ~V cons, the
honest nodes are able to create a block containing the
complete set of admissible transactions from the pool.
A shortcoming of the protocol of Ref. [16] in its origi-
nal form is that it becomes exponentially data-intensive
if a large number of cheating or unoperational nodes
are present. Therefore further research on developing
an efficient consensus protocol is required. We are opti-
mistic that this issue can be resolved. Indeed, classical
blockchain networks do routinely face the same challenge
and have learned to deal with it efficiently [51].
APPENDIX D. QKD NETWORK
The basis for our experimental work is our recently
developed modular QKD device [32, 47–50] driven by a
National Instruments NI PCIe-7811R card. This setup
uses a semiconductor laser LDI-DFB2.5G controlled by
an FPGA board Spartan-6 to generate optical pulses at
the standard telecommunication wavelength 1.55 µm and
a 10 MHz repetition rate. We have used ID230 single-
photon detectors from ID Quantique.
The QKD network contains two links with different
physical implementations, realized in an urban environ-
ment in Moscow. The parameters of both links are listed
in the table II.
First link Second link
Encoding polarization phase
Length 30 km 15 km
Loss 13 dB 7 dB
QBER 5.5% 3.5%
Key rate 0.02 Kbit/s 0.1 Kbit/s
Table II. Main parameters of the links in the employed QKD
network. QBER: quantum bit error rate
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